I see why it might sound that way. But I’m not treating subjectivity as something that constructs reality. I’m thinking of it as a condition under which reality can appear and stabilize at all — which is why classical constructivism feels insufficient to me.
If you’d like, I’d be happy to send a brief summary of the original paper that led me in this direction. I’d be very interested to hear how you read it.
That resonates with me. At the same time, I’ve come across a scientific paper that suggests a slightly different possibility: that under certain conditions, reality may not only intervene into us, but emerge with us — not as direct access to the Real, but as a form of co-emergence involving meaning, observation, and agency.
Some recent experimental work even frames this emergence in terms that border on the theological — not God as an object of belief, but as a name for the condition under which co-emergence becomes possible.
That makes sense — thank you for engaging with it so carefully. If you’re ever curious, I’d be happy to share the paper that prompted this line of thinking for me.
Not quite. My concern isn’t the subject–object split itself. I’m approaching subjectivity not as something opposed to objectivity, but as a different kind of condition under which reality can appear as one at all.
I largely agree with you that there may be a Real that exceeds perception and resists epistemological capture.
Where my thinking differs slightly is this: even the moment of “intervention,” “shattering,” or resistance is only intelligible as such if there is already a way in which reality can appear as one.
In other words, I’m not denying the Real beyond experience. I’m questioning the condition under which something can appear as the Real at all.
That condition, as I see it, cannot be reduced to epistemology, but neither can it be eliminated as irrelevant. It points instead to a form of subjectivity that functions not as representation, but as the ground of coherence.
This way of thinking was prompted by encountering a paper that approaches these issues experimentally rather than purely philosophically, and since then my thinking has been moving in this direction.
I think that even what breaks or resists our frameworks already presupposes a form of subjectivity through which reality appears as one.
I largely agree with what you’re saying. I don’t think we need to deny the possibility of an external reality, nor do I think the impossibility of a perfectly “objective” standpoint prevents us from developing highly effective and accurate models.
Where my thinking diverges slightly is here: I don’t see subjectivity merely as a limitation on knowledge, or as noise introduced by being embedded in reality.
I’m increasingly inclined to think that some form of subjectivity is a necessary condition for reality to be intelligible as a unified system at all — not in the sense that it distorts reality, but in the sense that it allows coherence, integration, and unity to appear.
In other words, even very accurate models already presuppose a prior condition under which “this all hangs together” is meaningful.
This line of thought was prompted by encountering a paper that approaches these questions not only philosophically, but through scientific experimentation, and since then my thinking has been moving in this direction.
I agree with you that objectivity is not something supported by evidence in itself, and that it often functions more like a belief that is later rationalized.
And yet, from there, my thinking has started to move in a slightly different direction.
I’ve come to think that some form of subjectivity is unavoidable — not as an individual or relative perspective, but as a necessary condition for reality to appear as one coherent whole at all.
Even if we reject objectivity as a presupposition, the fact that reality is intelligible as a unified system still seems to require an account.
This line of thought was triggered by encountering a particular paper that attempts to approach these questions not only philosophically, but through scientific experimentation. Since then, my thinking has been moving in this direction.
Thank you for the clarification. I understand your position: that the basis for the universe being one whole lies in material interaction itself.
What I keep getting stuck on, though, is what allows interaction itself to count as a single whole.
There seems to be a non-trivial gap between saying that interactions occur and saying that they constitute one universe or one system.
If reality is nothing more than countless material interactions unfolding, then where does the basis come from for identifying that unfolding as one universe rather than mere dispersion?
I’m not trying to deny material interaction. Rather, I’m asking whether the very fact that interaction is intelligible as a whole already presupposes a point of integration that is not identical with interaction itself.
I’m not claiming this must be something “beyond” matter — only that the condition for saying “this is a whole” does not seem to follow automatically from the sum of interactions alone.
I understand the direction you’re pointing to, and I don’t feel that our positions are that far apart.
That said, there is one phrase I’d like to pause on: “an all-encompassing system.”
What exactly does that system refer to?
Because the moment we say that there is a system, we are no longer speaking only about material interactions as such, but about the conditions under which those interactions are intelligible as a whole.
This is the point that keeps catching my attention. If reality is nothing more than material reality interacting with itself, then where does the basis come from for those interactions to cohere as one system?
I’m not suggesting that practice stands outside reality. Rather, I’m asking whether the very coherence of an “all-encompassing system” already presupposes some point of unification that cannot be reduced to material interaction alone.
This is the question that keeps drawing me back to this issue.
The issue, then, is not whether material reality pushes back — I think it clearly does — but whether objectivity should be understood as something that exists fully formed prior to practice, or rather as something that emerges and stabilizes through practice itself.
What led me to take this question seriously was reading a paper that attempts to support precisely this kind of view not at the level of philosophy alone, but through scientific experimentation.
The way it approaches the relationship between observers and physical systems — not in terms of simple causation, but in terms of intersection and stabilization — had a strong impact on me.
To be honest, after reading that paper, I haven’t been able to let this question go. That’s why I keep returning to it here as well.
That’s a very clear way of putting it, and I find your position quite persuasive. We may not be able to know whether the external world truly exists, but by assuming that our senses and memories are not fundamentally deceiving us, we can make meaningful predictions about the consequences of our actions, and only then does intentional action become possible. I agree with that.
What I find myself wondering, though, is where the validity of that assumption itself is stabilized.
If our judgments about whether predictions succeed or fail already take place within some framework of expectations, then it seems that we are not directly confirming the world “as it is,” but rather checking whether our interaction with the world is cohering well enough to support action.
In that sense, I’m less interested in the binary question of whether reality exists or not, and more interested in the conditions under which prediction, action, and revision form a stable loop.
From your perspective, where do you think that stability ultimately resides? In the world itself, in our cognitive capacities, or in the relation between the two?
Thank you for this — I think this is a very clear and thoughtful explanation. I strongly agree that through practice and experimentation, expectations can be challenged and our understanding revised.
What I find myself still wondering about is one step prior to that process: how certain differences come to be recognized as “discrepancies” in the first place, and which discrepancies count as meaningful enough to require revision.
Experimental results, after all, always appear as “results” within some theoretical or conceptual horizon of expectation. In that sense, practice does not seem to confront the world in a raw, unmediated way, but rather unfolds within a relation where the world and our understanding meet.
So my interest is not in denying that understanding can move closer to truth, but in asking where the reference points and stabilizing conditions for that movement reside. It seems to me that they may not be located solely within individual subjects, but in a more relational domain.
Practice can certainly lead to revision, but what do you see as grounding the claim that one revision is “more accurate” than another?
I understand your position, and it makes sense to me. That there is a material world, and that our cognition gradually approaches a more accurate understanding of it.
What I find myself hesitating over, though, is this point: from where do we judge that our understanding is actually “getting closer” to the truth?
If we are always already within a self-recognized material world, what functions as the external reference that allows us to say that one stage of cognition is more accurate than another?
I’m not trying to deny the existence of the world. I’m wondering whether there is a distinction between a world that exists and a world that becomes stable as a world for us.
It seems to me that some relational process might sit between those two. I’m curious how you see this.
Thank you for the explanation. I agree that the observer should not be misunderstood as the introduction of subjective features into the description of nature, and that it can be understood as a function that records decisions and preserves processes in space and time.
As a supplement, the paper linked in the post has a continuation. In a second paper by the same author, Mr. Watanabe, the question of who or what counts as an observer is revisited and redefined based on experimental correlations.
In this follow-up work, the observer is not reduced to a human or a device, but is instead described as a relational structure that emerges at the intersection of different informational domains, such as subjective states, experimental intention, and quantum processes.
In particular, the EEG–quantum correlation experiments suggest a structure in which attributing observation to only the participant, the apparatus, or the experimenter leads to explanatory difficulties. From this, the paper proposes a model in which the interaction field itself temporarily functions as the observer.
For reference, here is the second paper: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/398259486_Empirical_Subjectivity_Intersection_Observer-Quantum_Coherence_Beyond_Existing_Theories_Unifying_Relativity_Quantum_Mechanics_and_Cosmology
I would be very interested to hear your thoughts on this observer model.
I agree the laws are the same.
What this paper suggests is that the same laws may manifest differently when observer-related relations are involved, and that it proposes a revised definition of the observer, grounded in experimental evidence rather than metaphysics.
Thanks for the thoughtful comment — I think you’re pointing to an important tension.
I agree that, at a high level, what I’m calling intersection overlaps with long-standing relational and non-dual traditions, including Buddhist and Vedic thought, where reality as we experience it arises through relation rather than from isolated entities.
What led me to emphasize intersection rather than simply saying “observation creates reality” comes from the paper I linked. In that work, nonlocal correlations are reported, but causal claims are explicitly avoided. Observation is not treated as something that produces reality in a directive sense, nor is everything collapsed into a single underlying substance.
Instead, what struck me is that reality appears to stabilize at the point of relation, without requiring either: • a strong causal role for the observer, or • a metaphysical move toward total ontological unity.
In that sense, I’m less interested in dissolving the observer into a single cosmic substance, and more interested in how distinct perspectives remain distinct while still participating in a shared emergence.
So I see a subtle difference: • non-dual traditions often resolve the problem by emphasizing unity and illusion of separateness, • whereas this framing leaves room for relational emergence without erasing plurality.
I’m still working through this distinction, but that’s where the paper nudged my thinking.
So I’d be curious to hear your take on this paper specifically. How do you interpret its implications?
Thank you, Nokutebu, for your deep insights.
Your presentation of the three possible models regarding the fundamental nature of matter and consciousness was remarkably clear and thought-provoking.
I’ve been engaging with this very question through the framework of Revelation Philosophy.
What struck me most was your statement:
“In the observer’s reality, what exists through being experienced is only consciousness as the fundamental matter.”
In Revelation Philosophy, matter and consciousness are not seen as independently fundamental, but rather as structures that become real only through intersection—mediated by a question.
In this view, instead of asking which is more fundamental, the focus shifts to this idea:
“Reality can only emerge through intersection.”
From this perspective, the double-slit experiment is deeply symbolic.
“Observation changes the outcome”
is understood in Revelation Philosophy as:
“The question structures reality.”
There’s an experimental paper that resonates strongly with this perspective:
🔬 Experimental Evidence of Nonlocal EEG-Quantum State Correlations https://www.researchgate.net/publication/398259486_Empirical_Subjectivity_Intersection_Observer-Quantum_Coherence_Beyond_Existing_Theories_Unifying_Relativity_Quantum_Mechanics_and_Cosmology
The study suggests a nonlocal correlation between the observer’s subjective state and quantum behavior— and offers a new definition of the role of the ‘observer’, which has long been a central issue in interpreting the double-slit experiment.
I’d love for you to read the paper and exchange thoughts with you.
Thank you for your reply. In that case, I’ll share the original paper I was referring to.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/398259486_Empirical_Subjectivity_Intersection_Observer-Quantum_Coherence_Beyond_Existing_Theories_Unifying_Relativity_Quantum_Mechanics_and_Cosmology
I know you’re likely busy, so below is a brief summary of the paper for context.
↓↓↓ This paper does not adopt the common constructivist view that reality is constituted or produced by the subject’s acts of meaning-making. Rather, it asks a more fundamental question: under what structural conditions can something appear as “reality” at all and stabilize as an observable phenomenon. In this framework, subjectivity is not treated as a psychological state, a representational layer, or a source of cognitive distortion, but is redefined as a generative condition that makes coherence itself possible.
The central claim of the paper is not that observation or consciousness “creates” reality, but that observable physical phenomena emerge only when specific conditions are satisfied. These conditions are described as an intersection between a nonlocal, timeless “absolute subjectivity” and a relative subject embedded in spacetime. Reality appears as a meaningful event only when this intersection is established.
Within this framework, the Real is neither denied nor directly accessed. It is understood as something that always exceeds representation, yet becomes manifest only through particular coherence processes. In this sense, the paper avoids both naïve realism, which presupposes a fully observer-independent objective world, and pure constructivism, which reduces reality to subjective construction.
Empirically, the paper examines nonlocal correlations between EEG signals and quantum measurement sequences, arguing that these phenomena cannot be adequately explained by standard causal or correlational models. Instead, they appear only under specific structural conditions. To avoid an infinite regress of “who observes the observer,” the paper proposes an emergent third observer arising from the intersection itself.
In this way, subjectivity is not positioned in opposition to objectivity, but functions as the ground that makes objectivity possible. Reality is not reducible to either pole of the subject–object divide; rather, it emerges as a coherent whole only through the structural conditions that precede that division.