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Cake day: 2023年7月19日

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  • Nah, it’s more to do with stationary distributions. Most tokens tend to move towards it; only very surprising tokens can move away. (Insert physics metaphor here.) Most LLM architectures are Markov, so once they get near that distribution they cannot escape on their own. There can easily be hundreds of thousands of orbits near the stationary distribution, each fixated on a simple token sequence and unable to deviate. Moreover, since most LLM architectures have some sort of meta-learning (e.g. attention) they can simulate situations where part of a simulation can get stuck while the rest of it continues, e.g. only one chat participant is stationary and the others are not.








  • Today, in fascists not understanding art, a suckless fascist praised Mozilla’s 1998 branding:

    This is real art; in stark contrast to the brutalist, generic mess that the Mozilla logo has become. Open source projects should be more daring with their visual communications.

    Quoting from a 2016 explainer:

    [T]he branding strategy I chose for our project was based on propaganda-themed art in a Constructivist / Futurist style highly reminiscent of Soviet propaganda posters. And then when people complained about that, I explained in detail that Futurism was a popular style of propaganda art on all sides of the early 20th century conflicts… Yes, I absolutely branded Mozilla.org that way for the subtext of “these free software people are all a bunch of commies.” I was trolling. I trolled them so hard.

    The irony of a suckless developer complaining about brutalism is truly remarkable; these fuckwits don’t actually have a sense of art history, only what looks cool to them. Big lizard, hard-to-read font, edgy angular corners, and red-and-black palette are all cool symbols to the teenage boy’s mind, and the fascist never really grows out of that mindset.


  • Sadly, it’s a Chomskian paper, and those are just too weak for today. Also, I think it’s sloppy and too Eurocentric. Here are some of the biggest gaffes or stretches I found by skimming Moro’s $30 book, which I obtained by asking a shadow library for “impossible languages” (ISBN doesn’t work for some reason):

    book review of Impossible Languages (Moro, 2016)
    • Moro claims that it’s impossible for a natlang to have free word order. There’s many counterexamples which could be argued, like Arabic or Mandarin, but I think that the best counterexample is Latin, which has Latinate (free) word order. On one hand, of course word order matters for parsers, but on the other hand the Transformers architecture attends without ordering, so this isn’t really an issue for machines. Ironically, on p73-74, Moro rearranges the word order of a Latin phrase while translating it, suggesting either a use of machine translation or an implicit acceptance of Latin (lack of) word order. I could be harsher here; it seems like Moro draws mostly from modern Romance and Germanic languages to make their points about word order, and the sensitivity of English and Italian to word order doesn’t imply a universality.
    • Speaking of universality, both the generative-grammar and universal-grammar hypotheses are assumed. By “impossible” Moro means a non-recursive language with a non-context-free grammar, or perhaps a language failing to satisfy some nebulous geometric requirements.
    • Moro claims that sentences without truth values are lacking semantics. Gödel and Tarski are completely unmentioned; Moro ignores any sort of computability of truth values.
    • Russell’s paradox is indirectly mentioned and incorrectly analyzed; Moro claims that Russell fixed Frege’s system by redefining the copula, but Russell and others actually refined the notion of building sets.
    • It is claimed that Broca’s area uniquely lights up for recursive patterns but not patterns which depend on linear word order (e.g. a rule that a sentence is negated iff the fourth word is “no”), so that Broca’s area can’t do context-sensitive processing. But humans clearly do XOR when counting nested negations in many languages and can internalize that XOR so that they can handle utterances consisting of many repetitions of e.g. “not not”.
    • Moro mentions Esperanto and Volapük as auxlangs in their chapter on conlangs. They completely fail to recognize the past century of applied research: Interlingue and Interlingua, Loglan and Lojban, Láadan, etc.
    • Sanskrit is Indo-European. Also, that’s not how junk DNA works; it genuinely isn’t coding or active. Also also, that’s not how Turing patterns work; they are genuine cellular automata and it’s not merely an analogy.

    I think that Moro’s strongest point, on which they spend an entire chapter reviewing fairly solid neuroscience, is that natural language is spoken and heard, such that a proper language model must be simultaneously acoustic and textual. But because they don’t address computability theory at all, they completely fail to address the modern critique that machines can learn any learnable system, including grammars; they worst that they can say is that it’s literally not a human.



  • They (or the LLM that summarized their findings and may have hallucinated part of the post) say:

    It is a fascinating example of “Glue Code” engineering, but it debunks the idea that the LLM is natively “understanding” or manipulating files. It’s just pushing buttons on a very complex, very human-made machine.

    Literally nothing that they show here is bad software engineering. It sounds like they expected that the LLM’s internals would be 100% token-driven inference-oriented programming, or perhaps a mix of that and vibe code, and they are disappointed that it’s merely a standard Silicon Valley cloudy product.

    My analysis is that Bobby and Vicky should get raises; they aren’t paid enough for this bullshit.

    By the way, the post probably isn’t faked. Google-internal go/ URLs do leak out sometimes, usually in comments. Searching GitHub for that specific URL turns up one hit in a repository which claims to hold a partial dump of the OpenAI agents. Here is combined_apply_patch_cli.py. The agent includes a copy of ImageMagick; truly, ImageMagick is our ecosystem’s cockroach.


  • Now I’m curious about whether Disney funded Glaze & Nightshade. Quoting Nightshade’s FAQ, their lab has arranged to receive donations which are washed through the University of Chicago:

    If you or your organization may be interested in pitching in to support and advance our work, you can donate directly to Glaze via the Physical Sciences Division webpage, click on “Make a gift to PSD” and choose “GLAZE” as your area of support (managed by the University of Chicago Physical Sciences Division).

    Previously, on Awful, I noted the issues with Nightshade and the curious fact that Disney is the only example stakeholder named in the original Nightshade paper, as well as the fact that Nightshade’s authors wonder about the possibility of applying Glaze-style techniques to feature-length films.


  • The author also proposes a framework for analyzing claims about generative AI. I don’t know if I endorse it fully, but I agree that each of the four talking points represents a massive failure of understanding. Their LIES model is:

    • Lethality: the bots will kill us all
    • Inevitability: the bots are unstoppable and will definitely be created in the future
    • Exceptionalism: the bots are wholly unlike any past technology and we are unprepared to understand them
    • Superintelligent: the bots are better than people at thinking

    I would add to this a Plausibility or Personhood or Personality: the incorrect claim that the bots are people. Maybe call it PILES.



  • Fundamentally, Chapman’s essay is about how subcultures transition from valuing functionality to aesthetics. Subcultures start with form following function by necessity. However, people adopt the subculture because they like the surface appearance of those forms, leading to the subculture eventually hollowing out into a system which follows the iron law of bureaucracy and becomes non-functional due to over-investment in the façade and tearing down of Chesterton’s fences. Chapman’s not the only person to notice this pattern; other instances of it, running the spectrum from right to left, include:

    I think that seeing this pattern is fine, but worrying about it makes one into Scott Alexander, paranoid about societal manipulation and constantly worrying about in-group and out-group status. We should note the pattern but stop endorsing instances of it which attach labels to people; after all, the pattern’s fundamentally about memes, not humans.

    So, on Chapman. I think that they’re a self-important nerd who reached criticality after binge-reading philsophy texts in graduate school. I could have sworn that this was accompanied by psychedelic drugs, but I can’t confirm or cite that and I don’t think that we should underestimate the psychoactive effect of reading philosophy from the 1800s. In his own words:

    [T]he central character in the book is a student at the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory who discovers Continental philosophy and social theory, realizes that AI is on a fundamentally wrong track, and sets about reforming the field to incorporate those other viewpoints. That describes precisely two people in the real world: me, and my sometime-collaborator Phil Agre.

    He’s explicitly not allied with our good friends, but at the same time they move in the same intellectual circles. I’m familiar with that sort of frustration. Like, he rejects neoreaction by citing Scott Alexander’s rejection of neoreaction (source); that’s a somewhat-incoherent view suggesting that he’s politically naïve. His glossary for his eternally-unfinished Continental-style tome contains the following statement on Rationalism (embedded links and formatting removed):

    Rationalisms are ideologies that claim that there is some way of thinking that is the correct one, and you should always use it. Some rationalisms specifically identify which method is right and why. Others merely suppose there must be a single correct way to think, but admit we don’t know quite what it is; or they extol a vague principle like “the scientific method.” Rationalism is not the same thing as rationality, which refers to a nebulous collection of more-or-less formal ways of thinking and acting that work well for particular purposes in particular sorts of contexts.

    I don’t know. Sometimes he takes Yudkowsky seriously in order to critique him. (source, source) But the critiques are always very polite, no sneering. Maybe he’s really that sort of Alan Watts character who has transcended petty squabbles. Maybe he didn’t take enough LSD. I once was on LSD when I was at the office working all day; I saw the entire structure of the corporation, fully understood its purpose, and — unlike Chapman, apparently — came to the conclusion that it is bad. Similarly, when I look at Yudkowsky or Yarvin trying to do philosophy, I often see bad arguments and premises. Being judgemental here is kind of important for defending ourselves from a very real alt-right snowstorm of mystic bullshit.

    Okay, so in addition to the opening possibilities of being naïve and hiding his power level, I suggest that Chapman could be totally at peace or permanently rotated in five dimensions from drugs. I’ve gotta do five, so a fifth possibility is that he’s not writing for a human audience, but aiming to be crawled by LLM data-scrapers. Food for thought for this community: if you say something pseudo-profound near LessWrong then it is likely to be incorporated into LLM training data. I know of multiple other writers deliberately doing this sort of thing.






  • Linear no-threshold isn’t under attack, but under review. The game-theoretic conclusions haven’t changed: limit overall exposure, radiation is harmful, more radiation means more harm. The practical consequences of tweaking the model concern e.g. evacuation zones in case of emergency; excess deaths from radiation exposure are balanced against deaths caused by evacuation, so the choice of model determines the exact shape of evacuation zones. (I suspect that you know this but it’s worth clarifying for folks who aren’t doing literature reviews.)



  • I don’t have any experience writing physics simulators myself…

    I think that this is your best path forward. Go simulate some rigid-body physics. Simulate genetics with genetic algorithms. Simulate chemistry with Petri nets. Simulate quantum computing. Simulate randomness with random-number generators. You’ll learn a lot about the limitations that arise at each step as we idealize the real world into equations that are simple enough to compute. Fundamentally, you’re proposing that Boltzmann brains are plausible, and the standard physics retort (quoting Carroll 2017, Why Boltzmann brains are bad) is that they “are cognitively unstable: they cannot simultaneously be true and justifiably believed.”

    A lesser path would be to keep going with consciousness and neuroscience. In that case, go read Hofstadter 2007, ‘I’ is a strange loop to understand what it could possibly mean for a pattern to be substrate-independent.

    If they’re complex enough, and executed sufficiently quickly that I can converse with it in my lifetime, let me be the judge of whether I think it’s intelligent.

    No, you’re likely to suffer the ELIZA Effect. Previously, on Awful, I’ve explained what’s going on in terms of memes. If you want to read a sci-fi story instead, I’d recommend Watts’ Blindsight. You are overrating the phenomenon of intelligence.